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Search for Cause of Crash Unearths an Angry Feud

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June 10, 1996, Section B, Page 10Buy Reprints
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It had been a bruising struggle between two high-level, hardheaded Air Force officers. It ended five days before the jet carrying Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown and 34 others crashed, when the squadron's leader dismissed his deputy, who had been seen in the unit as fighting for safety over on-time performance, according to Air Force documents.

In investigating the crash, and why the pilots attempted such a hazardous landing in Dubrovnik, Croatia, Air Force officials found an atmosphere of pressure within the squadron's ranks that was reflected in the dismissal. They found no sign of pressure from Mr. Brown and the other high-powered passengers, despite speculation by people familiar with V.I.P. travel and assertions by a confidante of Mr. Brown that he was adamant about making the trip.

There is no evidence of any direct order for the pilots of the jet carrying Mr. Brown to do anything unsafe. But a review of the 7,000 pages of documents released with a report into the cause of the April 3 crash show that the investigators seeking to understand the event focused less on the pilot's background and training than on the conflict between their commanders.

The documents show that the ouster on March 30 of Lieut. Col. James A. Albright as the commander of the 76th Airlift Squadron at Ramstein Air Base in Germany hit hard within the squadron, which had seen the struggle between him and his superior, Brig. Gen. William E. Stevens, as one between safety versus promptness.

In trying to come to grips with the pilots' decision to press on with the flight despite the outdated navigational equipment in their plane and at the Dubrovnik airport, the Air Force report released on Friday cited as possible causes of the crash pilot error, insufficient navigational equipment, poor airport design and what it called a breakdown in the chain of command. The question of the squadron's state of mind that week clearly was viewed by the investigators as an important factor in determining the backdrop for the accident.

General Stevens vehemently denied to investigators that he ever compromised safety, but many of the dead pilots' colleagues in the squadron said, according to the documents, that Colonel Albright's dismissal was considered proof that Air Force commanders were less interested in safety than in delivering V.I.P.'s to their destinations on time.

General Stevens, who ordered the dismissal of Colonel Albright, appeared to chafe at the colonel's insistence on safety above all else -- even if it meant that planes were late or never took off at all, or that two-star Air Force generals were refused permission to fly the jets of their choice.

"General Stevens had a goal of 100 percent takeoffs -- all takeoffs on time," Col. John E. Mazurowski, another senior commander, told investigators. "One of General Stevens' favorite sayings at the time was to 'squeeze people.' And I remember specifically telling him that, you know, we were squeezing people on the line so much, you know, that their heads were going to pop."

In his testimony to the Air Force after the crash, Colonel Albright, who commanded deep loyalty from his pilots, was far harsher in his judgments of his former commander.

"Forgive me if I editorialize here, but I think there is an atmosphere of fear," he told the investigators in describing what had happened to the 76th Airlift Squadron under the leadership of General Stevens. "In my opinion, in the matrix of safety versus mission, Stevens is mission first."

The Air Force documents provide a rare and remarkable insight into military decision-making and the fine calculations Air Force pilots must make in deciding whether to transport passengers to potentially treacherous destinations like those in the Balkans.

General Stevens, who was removed from his command last month for having failed to follow through on orders to carry out a safety inspection at Dubrovnik earlier in the year, has denied that he ever intended for pilots to discount safety precautions.

"Safety first, and I always emphasized that," he said in a detailed interrogation by the Air Force investigators. "I removed Colonel Jim Albright because I lost faith in him as a commander of one of my squadrons. My decision had nothing to do with safety concerns."

But the documents show that a series of orders by General Stevens in the early days of his command of the 86th Airlift Wing, which includes the 76th Airlift Squadron, created the impression among many pilots that safety was a secondary concern to on-time departures of the V.I.P. flights. And when Colonel Albright was removed from his duties, that perception only grew.

"I don't know if that contributed to this accident, but that is a prevalent attitude in the squadron right now," Capt. Eugene F. Delaune told the investigators.

"They are afraid that the Wing doesn't want to hear, 'No.' That the wing just wants to hear, 'Get the job done,' " he said. "I feel they don't think they have support from above. If they make a safety call, it will be second-guessed."

Capt. Lane A. Seaholm, a member of the 86th Operations Group, said that the firing of Colonel Albright "sent a pretty bad message -- basically, any stand-up guy was going to get fired and replaced."

"The pilots thought it was a safety issue, and they were not getting backed up," said Lieut. Col. Michael R. Helms, who replaced Colonel Albright as squadron commander of the 76th. "They just think that the Wing doesn't care about safety and that they wouldn't back them up."

During their two month investigation of the crash, Air Force investigators appeared puzzled by the question of why two experienced, talented pilots would make so many fundamental mistakes and break so many rules on the flight carrying American dignitaries from Tuzla, Bosnia, to Dubrovnik.

By all accounts, the pilots aboard the T-43 jet, a military version of the Boeing 737, were exemplary. Captain Ashley J. Davis Jr., 35, had been widely praised by superiors for flying missions to 15 nations in Europe and the Middle East. His co-pilot, Capt. Timothy W. Shafer, 33, was also highly regarded.

Yet in the final moments before the crash, the jet was flying too fast and had veered off course. The pilots missed a radio beacon that should have guided them to a landing. They had failed to lower the flaps and landing gear.

"This was not the easiest landing in the world, but it was sure not the most difficult," said an Air Force official at the Pentagon. "So you have to wonder if the pilots had been distracted by something. Why would they ignore basic safety in bringing the plane down?"

In their stubbornness, General Stevens and Colonel Albright appear to have been well-matched. The general, who arrived in Germany only last June, was known as a brusque, no-nonsense commander who accepted little questioning from his subordinates.

"I've come to have a great deal of respect for what General Stevens has done and his methods," said Colonel Mazurowski.

At the same time, he said, the General's arrival at the 86th Airlift Wing was "a very tough time for the wing."

"We went through some very, very hard growing pains," he added.

The general announced that his first major goal was an improvement in the on-time performance of the Wing, and under General Stevens, on-time performance did improve -- rising from 60 to 65 percent of the flights to nearly 90 percent.

But documents show that the general's orders created the perception among pilots that safety would be sacrificed as a result.

"I think in communicating that on-time goal, sometimes people perceived that it was on-time at any cost, which was not true," said Lieut. Col. Christine D. Prewitt of the 75th Airlift Squadron, who describes herself as an admirer of General Stevens.

The general had found an adversary in Colonel Albright, whose insistence on safety precautions was seen by some of his colleagues as nearly obsessive, and who did not hesitate to confront General Stevens over the issue.

"He took the high moral ground every time, whether he really had it or owned it or not," Colonel Prewitt said of Colonel Albright.

Colonel Albright said under questioning by the Air Force investigators that he believed the immediate cause of his dismissal was his protest over the bullying demands of generals who wanted to pilot Air Force planes that they were not properly certified to fly.

A version of this article appears in print on  , Section B, Page 10 of the National edition with the headline: Search for Cause of Crash Unearths an Angry Feud. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

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